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Recent farm-debt problems have received much attention in the 
press, in Congress, and in state legislatures. Farm auctions, bankrupt 
machinery dealers, bank closings, and cracks in the Farm Credit System 
are signs of financial stress. A wringing-out of 10 percent or more 
of all farmers in the next several years is widely predicted, and 
Ohio will be a representative player in this grim game (USDA). While 
Ohio has 86 thousand farmers, only a quarter of them, 22 thousand, 
are commercial farmers. Of these commercial units, about 10 percent 
had serious problems with debt/asset rations above .7, and nearly 
20 percent had ratios of .4 to .7 in 1985 (Lee). Some 6,400 commercial 
farmers in Ohio were experiencing significant financial tension in 
early 1985, and about $1 billion was owed by farmers who are technically 
insolvent. Of all Ohio farmers, three percent (2,700) were involved 
in legal actions on delinquent loans in late 1985. 
Farmers and their representatives have been aggressive in seeking 
government assistance with these problems. Nationally, an emergency 
Farm Credit System Bill was passed by Congress tn December 1985 and 
adjustments in Farmers' Home Administration authorizations in the 
1985 Farm Bill were responses to these pressures. At least five state 
initiatives have also emerged: state loan guarantees, foreclosure 
moratorium, low interest rate loans, interest rate buy-downs or deferral 
programs, and use of linked state deposits (LDP) for agricultural 
loans (Popovich). In terms of dollar commitments, the linked-deposit 
programs a~e the most important with Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Mis-
souri, and Ohio involved. Two large linked-deposit efforts are in 
Michigan with $139 million authorized and in Ohio with $100 million. 
The operation of the linked-deposit program (LDP) in Ohio illustrates 
the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. 
Linked-Deposits in Ohio 
In early April 1985 the General Assembly (the state legislature) 
authorized the Treasurer to use $100 million in a LDP for agricultural 
loans. The explanation given for LDP was: "The General Assembly finds 
that there e~ists ••• an inadequate supply of agricultural credit 
• at affordable interest rates ••• which makes it difficult 
for persons to get into agriculture or for persons in agriculture 
to continue operations ••• " (116th General Assembly Conference Commit-
tee Report on H.B. No. 344, p. 10). LDP funds can be used to purchase 
time certificates in qualifying financial institutions until July 
1, 1987 of up to 24 months duration. Thus, the Treasurer may roll 
the $100 million through three cycles of lending: 1985, 1986, and 
1987. In addition, a loan-size ceiling of $100 thousand was set, 
lenders were asked to stress operating loans, and any commercial bank, 
production credit association (PCA), or federal land bank in Ohio 
can participate. 
In 1985 lenders were required only to send the State Treasurer 
a short form for each loan applicant. The Treasurer then purchased 
approximately 300 bank time certificates for the value and term of 
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the approved loans. These certificates earned an interest payment 
4 percentage points less than the market rate, with the lender passing 
the interest savings on to LDP borrowers. The lender assumed all 
loan recovery risk. To allow PCAs to participate, the Treasurer bought 
a single Farm Credit System debenture for $50 million to initiate 
LDP with PCAs. Money committed to PCA borrowers again earned 4 percent-
age points less than the mar1~et rate, while the state received market 
rates of interest on the remaining, uncommitted debenture balance. 
By the third week of June 1985 only ten weeks after the program 
was authorized, the entire $100 million was committed in the first 
cycle to 1,575 agricultural loans made by 92 banks or PCAs throughout 
the state (Report to State Treasurer). Commercial banks and PCAs 
each made about half of the number and value of loans authorized under 
the program, with five PCAs lending one-third of all LDP loans. The 
size of loans ranged from two thousand dollars to the maximum of $100 
thousand, the average size being $63 thousand. Almost one-third of 
the loans were for the maximum amount allowed. LDP reached farmers 
in 82 of Ohio's 88 counties and 93 percent of the loan value authorized 
was for a term of under one year. Less than five percent (83) of 
the 1,770 loan applications submitted to the State Treasurer were 
rejected because the applicants' debt/equity ratios were below .25, 
because their interest/total expenses ratios were less than .10 for 
the past three years, or because they were not full-time farmers. 
Who Received the Loans? 
In the first cycle of LDP (1985) 2 percent of all farmers in 
3 
Ohio--7 percent of t~e commercial farmers--received loans under the 
program. Lenders promoted LDP among their clients in various ways. 
A few lenders extended LDP loans to all of their farmer borrowers, 
other lenders did not advertise LDP loans and gave them only to farmers 
who asked for them, other lenders chose not to participate in LDP 
because they dln not want to appear to play favorites, a few le~ders 
gave LDP loans to their borrowers who most needed them, and still 
other lenders appear to have given the cheap loans to a random sample 
of their farmer borrowers. In a few cases lenders mentioned using 
the lure of an LDP loan to retain a client who might otherwise have 
switched to another lender. This appears to have been common in several 
PCAs that were struggling to maintain their mar~et share. Clearly, 
the PCAs would have lost numerous clients if special arrangements 
had not been made for PCAs to participate in LDP. 
Initially, I attempted to get 1985 data from the State Treasurer's 
Office in order to compare debt/equity ratios of LDP participants 
with similar ratios for all farmer borrowers in financial institutions 
participating in LDP. Unfortunately, I was unable to get access to 
the State Treasurer's information. My impressions of the character-
istics of borrowers who received LDP loans, as a result, are drawn 
from informal conversations with lenders who participated in LDP. 
These discussions led me to four conclusions: first, virtually all 
LDP borrowers could have gotten a loan from their lender without LDP. 
Second, lenders feel that all of the LDP borrowers were creditworthy. 
Third, in the minds of the lenders, no LDP borrower was switched from 
being a poor credit risk to being creditworthy through having access 
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to the cheaper LDP loans. And, fourth, lenders did not systematically 
direct LDP loans to those borrowers in their portfolio who were most 
financially stressed. 
Analysis of the Program 
The LDP should be evaluated using the objectives stated in the 
bill authorizing its funding: to augment the amount of loanable funds 
available for farmers in Ohio, and to assist those in financial stress 
or those trying to get into farming. This requires answering two 
questions: Did LDP result in an increase in agricultural lending in 
Ohio? And, did new farmers and farmers experiencing financial stress 
receive LDP loans? 
Answering the supply-augmentation question is complicated by 
fungibility and counterfactual problems; units of money are interchange-
able or fungible for each other. Thus, a lender, or a borrower, may 
substitute LDP funds for their own money or for funds they might have 
borrowed from other sources. A PCA, for example, can easily substitute 
LDP funds for money that it might otherwise borrow from the New York 
Bond Market via the Farm Credit System. Likewise, a commercial bank 
can easily substitute LDP funds for deposits that might, otherwise, 
be lent to farmers and divert the released deposits to investments 
in, say, U.S. Treasury bills. In either case, LDP would not augment 
the amount of loans made to farmers over what would have occurred 
without the program. 
The counterfactual problem is more vexing. One does not know 
what the actions of lenders and borrowers would have been without 
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LDP. Would financial intermediaries have made loans to most of the 
LDP participants without the program, and would the total volume of 
agricultural loans in Ohio have been about the same without LDP? 
These questions must be addressed obliquely for insights into what 
would have happened without LDP. 
Por the past se~eral years the total volume of agricultural credit 
in Ohio has contracted. Likewise, the loan/deposit ratios for most 
banks making agricultural loans have also declined because farmers' 
creditworthiness has withered, farmers have reduced theic debt, and 
borrowers have requested fewer and smaller loans because of low rates 
of return in agriculture. It is clear, nevertheless, that if farmers 
become more creditworthy the PCAs and commercial banks can easily 
obtain additional funds for farm lending from money markets or from 
their own deposits and assets. Informal discussions with about a 
dozen agricultural lenders in the state have led me to conclude that 
LDP did not add to the amount of money they would otherwise have lent 
to farmers. LDP substituted for other funds and, thus, had little 
effect on the supply of agricultural credit available in Ohio during 
1985. 
If the supply-augmenting impact of LDP has been negligible, then 
the income transfer resulting from the concessionary interest rate 
on the deposits and loans is LDP's most significant feature. Ignoring 
the small additional transactions costs incurred by the General Assembly 
in passing the enabling bill and by the Office of the Treasury in 
implementing the program ($25,000 additional was authorized by the 
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of the maximum LDP amount of $100 thousand for two years receive an 
interest rate subsidy of $8,000, while the LDP's smallest borrower 
of $2,000 for nine months only receives a subsidy of $60. Since only 
one-third of the LDP borrowers received SO percent of the total loan 
value in 1985, they also received half of the total subsidy, assuming 
the average length of term of loans across loan-size groups is ap-
proximately equal. Thus, the benefits of the LDP subsidy are concen-
trated when compared to all Ohio farmers and they are also concentrated 
when only the beneficiaries of LDP are analyzed. 
Comprehensive informatton is not available to compare LDP borrowers 
with other individuals borrowing from participating lenders, but a 
few general characteristics of LDP participants can be noted. Most 
importantly, to qualify for an LDP loan one must first be judged credit-
worthy by the individual lender. Since lenders assume recovery risks 
of LDP loans, lenders select LDP borrowers from the pool of individuals 
that the lender would be willing to lend to with or without LDP. 
Those who are insolvent, poor credit risks, or self financed are not 
in that pool. Also, when lenders are reducing their farm loans, it 
is difficult for new borrowers to obtain loans. To get into the LDP 
program, therefore, an individual must have a healthy income and asset 
situation, and also have had a working relationship with the lender. 
It is unlikely that a significant number of the 6,400 farmers in Ohio 
with debt/asset ratios in excess of .4 participated in LDP. Certainly, 
none of the 2,700 who are legally insolvent benefited from the program. 
All those who receive loans at concessionary interest rates benefit 
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from the cheap credit. But, the effectiveness of interest rate subsi-
dies are relative to the size of the problem doctored, and the treatment 
should be large enough to significantly affect borrowers' financial 
viability or access to farming. For example, two aspirins may relieve 
a normal headache, but have no effect on the pain from a broken back; 
one aspirin may relieve the headache of a child, but do nothing to 
dull an adult's migraine. Unfortunately, most of the farmers with 
migraines in Ohio will experience little relief from LDP because they 
were excluded from the program. Even if they could participate, the 
subsidy was too small for their pains. If, as estimated, there is 
$1 billion in bad farm debt in Ohio, the state's three-year $9 million 
subsidy involved in LDP will not cover even one-tenth of the interest 
payment on this debt for one year. 
Conclusions 
LDP has three favorable features. First, it demonstrated that 
the General Assembly cared about the problems faced by farmers in 
Ohio and tried to ease these difficulties. Second, the Office of 
Treasurer carried out the program quickly, imposed few loan transactions 
costs on lenders or borrowers, and was helpful in answering questions 
about the program. Third, LDP will give an interest rate break on 
loans to several thousand farmers in Ohio. All of these borrowers 
are slightly better off financially than they would have been if they 
had paid aarket rates of interest. 
At tbe same time, LDP has shortcomings. It is unlikely, for 
example, that LDP augmented the amount of money lent to farmers in 
9 
Ohio; most of the LDP borrowers would have received similar sized 
loans without LDP. Also, the concessionary interest rates were not 
a significant factor in altering the creditworthiness of potential 
borrowers. LDP likely resulted in the PCAs drawing fewer funds from 
the New York Bond Market and allowed commercial banks to invest more 
of their deposits in non-loan assets. 
It also appears that most of the benefits from concessionary 
interest rates on LDP loans went to individuals who were already farmers 
and whose financial conditions allowed them to qualify for loans, 
regardless of LDP. Since only a few farmers in the state got LDP 
loans, the benefits from LDP were highly concentrated among farmers 
who were better off than the farmers who were not creditworthy. This 
raises questions about the equitability of the program. 
Another cost of LDP is in "shooting one's political wad." The 
marginal political capital that groups expend each time they return 
to the political arena generally increases. That is, it may have 
been relatively easy for farmers and their representatives to get 
LDP from the General Assembly, but each succeeding effort to get as-
sistance encounters diminishing political returns. It is common for 
any elected body to shift its concerns to other matters once a public 
program is established to address a problem, even if the program does 
not resolve the problem. 
What are the lessons that might be learned from LDP? Most im-
portantly, it demonstrates the severe limitations any credit program 
has in addressing agricultural problems. Credit programs are easy 
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to start, but their impact is nearly impossible to control because 
of fungibility. Also, subsidies tied to loans often fail to reach 
the desired target group and the effect of the subsidy is almost always 
regressive on income distributions (Adams and others). Concessionary 
credit programs are of little help to those experiencing extreme finan-
cial stress. 
How might the state subsidy in Ohio have been more effectively 
targeted? It may have been possible, for example, for the General 
Assembly to place $9 million into a lottery for all those in the state 
who were losing their farms or who wanted to enter farming. The first 
200 lucky people drawn from the pool could have received a $45 thousand 
grant each to pay off part of their debts. Or, $9 million could have 
been given to one or several agencies to help bankrupt farmers and 
their families seek other employment. Or, the state could have used 
the money to buy some of the distressed farm land for parks and hunting 
reserves from farmers who want to partially liquidate their holdings 
and ease their debt positions. This would have increased farm land 
values and thus benefited all farmers in the areas of the purchases. 
It's unfortunate that the difficulties currently experienced 
by U.S. farmers are mostly labeled as debt problems; financial stress 
is a symptom rather than a cause of an economic fever. Low farm prices, 
bad luck, declining land values, excessively liberal lending practices 
in the past~ and weak farm management have caused this fever. While 
emergency credit programs may temper the fever, they do not attack 
its roots. Efforts such as Ohio's LDP offer little help for those 
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who are most stressed, allocate benefits mostly to those who don't 
need it, and grant benefits too small to provide a significant amount 
of relief. 
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General Assembly for the Treasurer), the main cost of LDP has been 
the opportunity costs of state funds allocated to LDP due to the conces-
sionary interest rates. If all of the $100 million LDP funds are 
fully committed for three of the four years possible, the subsidy 
will be $12 million (.04 x $100 million x 3). If the funds are fully 
committed at concessionary rates for only the equivalent of ni~e mont~s 
in each of the three years the subsidy will come to $9 million, a 
more probable figure. All citizens of Ohio bear the cost of this 
subsidy. As an aside, this subsidy is small compared to the $100 
million plus spent by the state to make whole the depositors in Home 
State Savings Bank in the Spring of 1985. 
While the amount of the LDP subsidy was small, it is important 
to know the extent to which it reached the needy, and whether or not 
the subsidy received was large enough to make a difference. Fortun-
ately, subsidies tied to concessionary interest rates are easy to 
measure. The subsidy is always proportional to the size of loan: 
no loan no subsidy, small loan small subsidy, large loan large subsidy. 
Also, the longer the term of the loan, the larger the subsidy. Since 
loan size, assets, and income of borrowers are positively correlated, 
interest rate concessions allocate subsidies regressively. Because 
only 2-4 percent of all farmers in Ohio will likely receive a conces-
sionary priced LDP loan--depending on how many new borrowers partici-
pate in cycles two and three of LDP--at least 95 percent of Ohio's 
farmers will not benefit from LDP. At most, LDP will reach only 10-15 
percent of the 22 thousand commercial farmers in Ohio. Borrowers 
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